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When you think of Europe ten years from now – what is the most striking change you
are seeing?
What I see  ten years from now is: 1) less union and more diversity; and 2) less
emphasis on territory (i.e., on the states as the exclusive actors of European
integration) and more on functional (public or private) associations. As a result, the
EU would change from a would-be federation (or quasi-state) to a "club of clubs",
built around specific functions or tasks.
Let’s start with your first point, less union and more diversity. What makes you think
so?
The severity of the monetary crisis should not make us forget that the integration
project is facing another, potentially even more explosive, problem: the growing
economic, social and political diversity of an EU whose membership is still
supposed to expand. This is the mistake committed by those who propose a two-
speed Europe, with the members of the euro zone forming the avant-garde (e.g.,
Bofinger, Habermas and Nida-Ruemelin, FAZ of 4 August 2012: "Einspruch gegen
die Fassandendemokratie"). Not only is the present euro group already highly
heterogeneous; in the future it is bound to become even more diverse, unless the
principle of the acquis – which obliges every new member state eventually to join the
euro zone – is given up.
What makes you so sure that diversity will grow? Do you think that all efforts to
promote economic cohesion and legal harmonization in the EU are bound to be
futile?
Diversity between, say, Germany and Greece is already quite large; that between
Northern Europe and the future members from the Balkans will be even larger, and
there is a definite possibility that also the Ukraine may join. Experts tell us that it will
take decades to close the gap, even under the most favourable hypotheses. Think
how wide still is the gap between Northern and Southern Italy—more than 150 years
after political and economic union! Moreover, when socioeconomic differences are
so great, policy and legal harmonization is counterproductive: the traditional one-
size-fits-all approach to European integration is obsolete.
What about the other part of the equation? Why less union?
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If we want to think constructively about the future of European integration after the
crisis of monetary union, we must consider alternatives that are reasonably robust
against the two main problems the EU is facing today: excessive centralization in
some domains, and a level of internal diversity that is changing the very nature of
the enterprise. The mistake is to assume that there is only one kind of union. In
fact, before the long century of nationalism Europe was already united: culturally,
economically, socially, even politically; but it was a special type of unity that did not
exclude frequent, if limited, wars: unity in diversity, embodied in a system of states
competing and cooperating with each other.
I don’t quite see how the Thirty-Years War, if that is what you are referring to,
qualifies as a “limited” war. But anyway – do you think the pre-modern past of
Europe could serve as a model for its future? What exactly do you have in mind?
I am referring mainly to the period between the Peace of Westphalia and the French
revolution, the period covered by Eric Jones in his great “The European Miracle” – a
book everybody interested in European integration should read. History is important,
and Jones explains very well, in terms of economics and of geopolitics, why Europe
has always rejected centralization while favouring inter-state competition.
You advocate strongly against a two-speed solution, even while you stress the
growing diversity in Europe. How should we proceed, then?
Given the level of socioeconomic heterogeneity, the model of integration à la carte,
 advocated by  Ralph Dahrendorf  in the 1970s, looks more flexible, hence more
robust, than the two-speed alternative. For Dahrendorf, integration à la carte meant
that there would be common European policies only in areas where the member
states have a common interest.
So, a functional approach rather than a territorial one?
Exactly. The economic theory of clubs (Majone, "Europe as the Would-be World
Power", 2009, pp.219-222) provides a good conceptual foundation for the functional
approach to supranational governance: a Europe of “clubs” — a club of clubs
– organized around functional tasks. In the terminology of the economic theory
of clubs, a “club good” is a public good from whose benefits individuals may be
excluded — e.g., if they are not willing to contribute to the common effort. An
association established to provide excludable public goods, i.e., club goods, is a
“club”. Monetary union was conceived as a public good: all member states were
expected to join. Today’s euro zone is a club.
How would that Europe of clubs look like, institutionally? Would there be room for a
parliament? For a powerful commission? For union citizenship?
The main task of the Commission would be to ensure that competition – not only
economic but also intergovernmental competition – produces stable outcomes.
The rules of economic competition would have to be expanded to cover also
intergovernmental and inter-institutional competition. If Brussels would concentrate
on this task instead of pretending to be a quasi-government, the financial, legal, and
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legitimacy resources at its disposal would be sufficient. The national parliaments,
rather than the EP, would play a key role. Union citizenship would be comparable to
citizenship in the Roman empire. Remember Saint Paul’s “civis romanus sum”!
As opposed to citizenship in the national sense?
As distinct from national citizenship; ditto for all the other imitations of national
symbols: European flag, common passport, etc.
 Would a Europe of clubs still be a powerful organism, politically?
Of course, as long as there is clear evidence of sufficient popular support for what it
is doing. The Single Market project, for example, seems to enjoy broad support even
in Euro-sceptic countries. Hence, this would be a natural starting point from which
to assess the extent of democratic acceptance of further movement towards closer
integration.
How do you measure democratic acceptance? By polls?
Primarily by referenda. There are good reasons why EU leaders and European
institutions are so afraid of them.
Up until now the community method worked the other way around, didn’t it? First
action, and if it’s successful people will accept it. Do you think this method has come
to an end?
The Community method is obsolete; it embodies the one-size-fits-all approach
and it violates basic democratic principles. Monnet’s operational principle was fait
accompli: “the people weren’t ready to agree to integration, so you had to get on
without telling them too much about what was happening” (Pascal Lamy).
Usually, people don’t care much about European policy debates. Who is to blame for
that?
Everybody: European institutions, national governments, students of European
integration. Until the euro crisis, the political culture of European integration was one
of total optimism. Reaching agreement was already considered success; in other
words, the criteria of evaluation were process- rather than outcome-oriented. After
the euro crisis this approach is no longer possible. Once decisions about the extent
of integration are no longer taken in camera but are submitted to the decision of the
voters, however, the provision of correct information about expected benefits and
costs, about successes and failures, becomes truly indispensable. Even in case of
a project like the Single Market, the general public should know that the promise of
reaching that goal by 1992 is still far from being fulfilled.
Is it?
The services sector contributes more than 70 % of GDP in all advanced economies.
This sector is still growing, but it is largely regulated at the national level, as the
Commission had to admit in 2010. A single market in services is not achievable
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because of deep-rooted differences of historical and cultural traditions, as well
as in levels of economic development. Fazit: we have less of a “common market”
today than 20 or 30 years ago. What the member states of the EU need today is not
more top-down, one-size-fits-all harmonization, but more flexibility and inter-state
competition.
So, basically you view the EU in 2023 as a sort of intergovernmental agency that
punctually coordinates state cooperation where such coordination is required and
that has forgone all federal ambitions? Is that it?
I see the Commission as a strong monitor of inter-state and inter-jurisdictional
competition, as well as the manager of common (i.e., generally supported) projects.
National parliaments should be much more involved. I never saw a convincing
argument in support of federalism in Europe. Even Habermas, Schaeuble and
company keep repeating that they are not advocating a federation. Unfortunately,
they never tell us what they want, but in practice they propose more of the same
Don’t you feel a bit sad by that prospect?
It is difficult to be sad about something unfeasible. Hegel was not sad  when he
described the German-Roman Empire as “ein Staat in Gedanken und kein Staat in
der Wirklichkeit”. I am not sad but disgusted with all those who keep talking about
European integration without explaining why Europe cannot have a truly integrated
foreign and security policy. With a truly common foreign policy we could have a
European confederation (Bund) if not a federation.
Die Fragen stellte Maximilian Steinbeis. Nächste Folge: Frank Schorkopf zum
Einzug des Pragmatismus in die Europapolitik und zur epochalen Reform der
europäischen Verträge in Den Haag 2016.
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